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ABSTRACT
We analyse Stack Overflow (SO) to understand challenges and
confusions developers face while dealing with privacy-related
topics. We apply topic modelling techniques to 1,733 privacy-
related questions to identify topics and then qualitatively anal-
yse a random sample of 315 privacy-related questions. Identi-
fied topics include privacy policies, privacy concerns, access
control, and version changes. Results show that developers
do ask SO for support on privacy-related issues. We also find
that platforms such as Apple and Google are defining privacy
requirements for developers by specifying what “sensitive” in-
formation is and what types of information developers need to
communicate to users (e.g. privacy policies). We also examine
the accepted answers in our sample and find that 28% of them
link to official documentation and more than half are answered
by SO users without references to any external resources.
Author Keywords
Software Developers; Usable Privacy; Stack Overflow.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Human and societal aspects of
security and privacy; Usability in security and privacy;
•Software and its engineering→ Software creation and man-
agement; •Social and professional topics → Privacy poli-
cies;
INTRODUCTION
When designing software, developers have to make a range
of decisions that impact many aspects of the software such as
efficiency, maintainability, and privacy. Developers located
in large organisations may have access to dedicated staff with
training in such topics to assist them, but for many developers,
they are expected to incorporate these features into their code
on their own. This observation begs the question of how
developers manage privacy in software as well as how they
interpret and think about privacy-related coding issues.
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Security and privacy can be challenging for developers to
get right, even with the support of tools [12, 22, 49]. De-
veloper errors are a common source of vulnerabilities [24]
with many causes ranging from APIs with poor developer
support [1, 47] to static analysis tools that produce too many
false positives [38]. Privacy can also be challenging for small
organisations where their income depends privacy-unfriendly
monetisation methods such as ad networks [14, 46].
Privacy, as a social norm, can define how security is being im-
plemented as a technological requirement [15, 23]. While prior
research has found several reasons for developers’ poor secu-
rity practices [30, 53], we know comparatively little about the
privacy challenges and concerns they face. Efforts to introduce
privacy into technical levels such as privacy by design [35] are
still nascent, and there is a gap between these frameworks and
how software developers approach privacy [33].
Stack Overflow [69] (SO) is one of the largest developer Q&A
platforms and defines itself as “an open community for any-
one that codes.” It attracts a wide range of developers who
ask questions about programming, security, and data manage-
ment [18, 56, 76]. SO’s dataset has been heavily used for
research on such topics as: what factors makes it a successful
Q&A platform [45], security issues developers face and how
they interact and build knowledge around it [43, 76], and the
negative impact of SO code snippets in software security [2].
Our research combines techniques from the literature on SO
analysis with questions about the privacy-related tasks of de-
velopers. Our research questions are: 1) What topics do SO
users associate with the word “privacy”? 2) What or who is
pushing SO users to engage with privacy related topics?
To answer our research questions, we collect SO questions
that mention “privacy” in the title or tags and then apply topic
modelling and manual qualitative analysis methods. We find
that developers ask questions when dealing with permissions,
access control, encryption, and privacy policies. Similar to
other works [18, 56, 71], we look at question types such as
“how” questions that ask for instructions and help, “conceptual”
when they look for advice and suggestion in early stages of de-
velopment, “errors” which includes crashes, and “unexpected”
which includes surprises from updates or features being added
or removed. We further analysed the accepted answers, which
shows that 28% of those link to official documentation.
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RELATED WORK
Stack Overflow
SO is aimed at software developers, covering various topics
such as website development, databases, version control, and
security [16]. It has an Alexa rank of 43 [4] and more than 50
million unique visitors per month (as of September 2019) [66].
SO Users: SO surveys developers every year and publishes
the results. The 2019 survey includes responses from 88,883
software developers from 179 countries in which 85.6% of
respondents are SO users. Most respondents “said they are
professional developers or who code sometimes as part of their
work, or are students preparing for such a career” [67]. Over
85% visit SO at least a few times per week, with over 60%
visiting every day and 96.9% using it to find answers to specific
questions. 73.9% are employed full-time at companies whose
size ranges from “just me” to “10,000 or more employees”.
Impact of SO on software security: Developers utilise SO
knowledge and code snippets to build their projects [6, 54,
74]. A study of 289 open-sources projects showed that 30.5%
of projects contained code matching code found on SO with
some modification [74]. However, code reuse from SO can
also introduce vulnerabilities [2, 3, 26]. For example, Fischer
et al. found that snippets from SO questions that contained
security-related code were observed in 15.4% of applications
on Google Play (1.3m apps), and 97.9% of those apps had at
least one snippet with insecure code [26].
Researchers have also studied the topics developers talk about;
including analysis with natural language processing techniques
(NLP) [5, 16, 18, 56, 71, 76] and manual qualitative tech-
niques [18, 36, 43, 44, 47, 48, 52, 55, 71]. For example, an
analysis of questions about Puppet, a configuration language
tool, shows a need to support Puppet syntax error finding [55].
Topics: Prior topic modelling of security SO questions found
five main categories: web security (51%), system security
(19%), cryptography (17%), software security (9%), and mo-
bile security (4%); with popular subjects including: password,
hash, signature and SQL injection (out of 30,054 posts) [76].
Such outcomes can help both industry and researchers to under-
stand better the challenges developers are facing. For example,
injection (such as SQL, NoSQL, LDAP) and broken authen-
tication such as passwords, keys, and session tokens are the
two top risks in OWASP’s ten most critical web application
security risks [50], which are similar to the findings of Yang
et al. who also studied SO questions [76].
Question types: Questions posed on SO can be a good indica-
tor of the areas of development SO users require guidance on.
For example, they ask questions around library features, then
clarify optimal implementations once they are confident with
basic functionality. They will ask for solutions, workarounds
and explanations when their code has errors or unintended
features. Finally, they may ask for improved solutions with
best practices [5, 18, 48, 56, 71].
Privacy and developers
There is no unified cross-discipline definition of privacy [61].
Daniel J. Solove describes privacy as “too complicated a con-
cept to be boiled down to a single essence” [62, p.485], so he
instead made a taxonomy of activities that potentially can be
harmful to privacy: information collection (e.g. surveillance),
information processing (e.g. identification), information dis-
semination (e.g. disclosure), and invasion (e.g decisional
interference) [62]. In the engineering realm, privacy is de-
fined as a set of requirements collected from stakeholders. For
instance, software developers are expected to pay attention
to activities that can threaten privacy in information systems
such as data transfer, storage, and processing [64]. Notice and
choice, privacy-by-policy, privacy-by-architecture [64], and
Privacy by Design (PbD) [20, 21, 35, 39, 73] are some exam-
ples among many other frameworks which include practices
and guidelines to bring privacy into the design space.
Prior research uses PbD to understand the privacy practices of
software developers and development [17, 31, 33, 35, 59]. Ann
Cavoukian, who coined the term, describes PbD as “assures
an end-to-end chain of custody and responsibility right from
the very start” [21, p. 406]. PbD thus aims to bring privacy
into the system development process [32].
PbD for developers: Semi-structured interviews with 27 de-
velopers showed that they interpreted the concept of privacy
as a set of smaller concepts, such as security, confidentiality,
purpose specification, and consent. In contrast, concepts such
as notice, minimisation, and rectification were not mentioned
by many participants. Participants reported that they were
familiar with other privacy concepts, such as user transparency
and automatic expiration date, yet admitted they used these
technologies infrequently [33].
Interviews with senior engineers show that privacy is seen as a
burden which no one views as their own responsibility as well
as a concept that is hard to define because it is wrapped up
in legal jargon [17]. These results are similar to a study that
was carried out 15 years previous, which indicates stagnation
in engineer’s mindsets [17]. Beyond interviews, a discourse
analysis of two mobile developer forums for privacy relevant
conversations found that developers of these forums were
concerned about how third-parties are collecting data, the
privacy implications of features requested by end-users, and
the legal consequences of their actions [60].
Developers are one of several privacy decision-makers: The
costs and effects of developers’ choices and mistakes in soft-
ware systems can be enormous [25, 27]. These decisions,
however, are influenced by the choices made in designing the
systems they are dependent on, including platforms, APIs, and
human organisations. For example, mobile platforms shape the
privacy mindsets of their developers; iOS developers are more
concerned about “notice and consent” as Apple promotes it,
while Android developers advertise privacy as an extra feature
to stand out in the market [31].
API design influence developer choices. A lab study with de-
velopers given the choice between coarse and precise location
APIs found that they chose the coarse location option [37],
providing more privacy. Nudges and help from documenta-
tion [13], models [42], and IDE plugins [41] can also assist
developers in privacy-friendly software development.
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Organisation internals are another key factor in the security
and privacy practices of developers [10, 11, 14, 33, 75]. For
example, the size of the company influences the privacy be-
haviour of developers; larger companies are more concerned
about having a privacy policy (PP) [14]. Moreover, some de-
velopers follow practices suggested by their employers, such
as programming languages and tools [11]. They also benefit
from the advice of security experts in their organisation [11].
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)
LDA [19] is a common method of topic modelling. It is an
unsupervised method, meaning that the topics are not labelled
by humans, but are discovered naturally through patterns of
clustering in the data. For example, LDA might discover that
documents fall into two topics, one in which typical words
include (baseball, bat, pitcher), and another in which these
common words are (neural, Gaussian, marginalised). A hu-
man annotator is needed to label these topics as “baseball”
and “machine learning”, as the model does not assign labels.
Note that the word “statistics” could easily signify either topic;
vocabulary is not exclusive to a single topic, but has different
distributions according to topic. LDA models text generation
as a two-step process: first, a mixture of topics is sampled
through the Dirichlet distribution, then a mixture of vocabu-
lary items is sampled from the Dirichlet distribution associated
with each topic. The model assumes that the words in a doc-
ument are sampled by selecting a topic from the mixture of
topics and a word from the mixture of words associated with
that topic. We interpret these topics by inspecting the words
most indicative of each topic. We take advantage of this au-
tomation to analyse a larger dataset than is feasible with human
annotation. The approaches in Section 2.1 use LDA to find
topics in SO questions [5, 16, 18, 56, 71, 76].
Our contribution
A systematic literature review of developer-centred security
shows that few papers study the intersection of developers and
privacy, and further research is needed in this area [70]. Our
work contributes to this research area by studying SO privacy-
related questions using both automatic (LDA), and manual
(qualitative coding) approaches. Our approach is a bottom-up
analysis which builds upon questions developers asked when
they faced a privacy-related problem or felt the need to dispel
confusion on a related topic. This study complements existing
interview work in the privacy space.
METHOD
SO data collection
We collected three data sets from SO; each composed of ques-
tion and answer text as well as metadata such as the number
of views and votes. SO-all is the set of all SO questions. We
use this set to provide comparison statistics. SO-privacy is the
set of all SO questions where the word “privacy” appeared in
either the question title or tags (n=1733). The term “privacy”
was selected after iterating on several alternatives and finding
minimal improvement of quality. We use this set for most
of the quantitative analysis, including the LDA topic model.
Finally, SO-privacy-rand is a set of 315 questions randomly
selected from SO-privacy and is used in the manual qualitative
How to disable Google asking permission to regularly check installed apps
on my phone?
 Asked 5 years, 11 months ago  Active 1 year, 5 months ago  103k timesViewed
83
13
I'm developing an Android app, which I therefore endlessly build and install on my test device. Since a
couple days I get with every build/install a question asking
Google may regularly check installed apps for potentially harmfull behaviour. Learn more in Google
Settings > Verify apps.
I get the option to Accept or Decline. I've declined about a hundred times now, but it seems to be Googles
policy to keep on asking until I get sick of the message and finally click Accept. But I don't want that!
So my question: how do I let Google know once and for all that I do not want them regularly checking
installed apps on my phone?
   android permissions privacy policy
edited May 9 '14 at 6:54 asked Oct 9 '13 at 7:35
kramer65
11.4k 68 205 352
 – 
Particularly need a solution for this to support automated UI testing, e.g. with Espresso, because the APK can't even be
installed on a new emulator instance unless the Accept/Decline button is clicked. Is there a  like
 ( ) for this?
@Rule
GrantPermissionRule developer.android.com/reference/android/support/test/rule/… Michael Osofsky
Apr 4 '18 at 19:23
10 Answers
98
On Android prior to 4.2, go to , tap  and uncheck the option .Google Settings Verify apps Verify apps
On Android 4.2+, uncheck the option  and/or 
.
Settings > Security > Verify apps Settings > Developer
options > Verify apps over USB
edited Apr 3 '14 at 11:14
Helen
39k 5 95 150
answered Oct 9 '13 at 7:42
Sunny
9,397 7 47 80
23
 –   
Ah! I just now see it under Settings > Developer Options > Verify apps over USB.. Sorry, I just got so sick of this
message and the fact that I couldn't find the setting.. kramer65 Oct 9 '13 at 7:45
8  –   Not in Settings app find the  app on your phone.Google Settings Sunny Oct 9 '13 at 7:46
 –  Ah, and I had never heared of the Google settings app either.. Cheers! kramer65 Oct 9 '13 at 7:47
 –  It's the default settings app ;) CommonGuy Oct 9 '13 at 8:33
2  –
  
On Android 5 I had to use the Google Settings app. Verify apps over USB was grayed out in the Developer options.
Rolf Nov 16 '15 at 15:57
Figure 1. A sample privacy-related question with an accepted answer.
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Figure 2. Count of questions mentioning privacy per year (SO-privacy).
coding. Figure 1 shows a sample privacy-related question.
All data was collected using the Stack Exchange Data Ex-
plorer [65]. The research was conducted in accordance with
our institute’s ethics procedures.
Looking at SO-privacy, the first question was created on 02
Aug. 2008 (for SO-all it was on 31 July 2008), and the most
recent was created 17 Aug. 2019. 1,428 questions have at
least one answer, and 790 have an accepted answer. Tables 1
and 2 provide a comparison between the data sets in terms of
users and questions. Figure 2 shows the number of questions
asked by year and Figure 3 shows the top 50 tags assigned by
askers in SO-privacy.
Topic extraction - LDA
Documents were formed from SO-privacy by concatenating
the question title and body, lemmatised with stop words re-
moved using spaCy [63]. All code samples and URL details
were removed so the topics would be based only on natural
language data. We ran a bigram LDA at 2000 iterations, with a
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Reputation1 Views2 Up Votes3 Down Votes3
All users (10,901,490)
Avg 106 14 11 1
SD 2,312 708 180 361
SO-all question askers (3,501,541)
Avg 2,631 389 270 29
SD 12,929 3,780 903 428
SO-privacy question askers (1,684)
Avg 3,430 448 268 49
SD 18,453 1,974 706 648
SO-privacy-rand question askers (312)
Avg 4,889 602 312 110
SD 25,413 2,927 785 1,135
Table 1. Stats for SO users and users in our subsets. 1Can be gained
by posting good questions and answers. 2Number of times the profile is
viewed. 3How many up/down votes the user has cast.
Score1 Views Answers Comments Favourites2
SO-all (18,123,431)
Avg 2 2,279 2 2 3
SD 23 18,419 1 3 20
SO-privacy (1,733) - Used for LDA and qualitative analysis section
Avg 3 1,416 1 2 3
SD 16 7,338 2 2 11
SO-privacy-rand (315) - Used for coding findings section
Avg 4 1,378 1 2 3
SD 25 5,281 1 2 8
Table 2. Stats for questions. 1The difference between up votes and down
votes. 2Similar to bookmarking a question.
variety of topic counts, from 5 to 60. After discussions among
researchers, we selected 15 topics as the best setting.
Qualitative analysis
Two researchers first independently read through 40 questions
drawn at random from SO-privacy, and also reviewed the
output of the LDA topics. Then during multiple discussion
sessions and meetings they shared their observations and iden-
tified four interesting elements of the questions deserving of
further analysis: 1) the question type, based on existing tax-
onomies [5, 16, 18, 71]; 2) the driver that makes the user need
to ask the question (e.g. compiler error, client requirement, or
Facebook warning); 3) the aspect of privacy that the question
relates to (e.g. setting app permissions); 4) accepted answers.
Question type
In prior work, question type focuses on the shape of the ques-
tion, such as “how do I...?” questions. After reviewing both
the question types found in prior work [5, 16, 18, 71] and the
shapes of questions found in the SO-privacy set, we narrowed
the question types to: 1) conceptual questions that ask for
higher level explanation, as well as moral, legal, and regula-
tory advice; 2) unexpected behaviour the asker wants to be
explained; 3) error questions where the asker provides an error
and asks how to fix it or why it is happening; and 4) questions
looking for instructions, solutions, and best practice.
Coding procedure: After the question type codebook was so-
lidified, both researchers coded 10% of the data. The question
types inter-rater reliability kappa was 70%. One researcher
coded the rest of the data for question types, and the other
researcher coded another 10% to make sure they did not drift
apart and have a similar understanding of the data. Their final
kappa was 77% which is considered as a good agreement [57].
Drivers
A driver is the event, technology, or motivation that caused
the asker to post a question on SO. Some drivers are expected,
such as getting a compiler error, while others are more unique
to our data, such as concern over how to comply with the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Our practice
questions cited many reasons for interacting with privacy, such
as requirements from clients, concern about laws, and the de-
velopment platform (e.g. Facebook) giving privacy warnings
that prevented code deployment. Unlike question type, drivers
were quite varied and not easy to classify a-priori. Therefore,
we decided to use open coding. One researcher went through
all the questions and provided one or more open codes. A
second researcher did the same for 10% of the dataset. We do
not report the kappa values as they were open coded.
The two researchers then completed a thematic analysis [40]
of the driver codes, resulting in four themes: 1) feedback from
platforms such as operating systems (OS) or companies (e.g.
Facebook, Google Play, Apple Store), 2) personal concerns
and business reasons (e.g. company or client requirements),
3) laws and regulations such as GDPR, and 4) too vague or
unclear to code properly.
Privacy aspect
The privacy aspect of a question describes how it relates to the
concept of privacy. SO questions can be complex and contain
multiple parts, not all of which involve privacy. For example,
an asker wants to make sure users scroll to the bottom of the
PP page before the “accept” button activates, but is having
trouble with the way the fonts are showing on the page. In
this case, the privacy aspect is ensuring users read the PP.
Similar to the drivers, privacy aspects appeared to have a wide
range which was hard to categorise a-priori. Therefore, we
decided to open code the privacy aspect. Because aspects
seemed to involve both a subject (PP, camera) as well as an
action (create, change, use), coders were encouraged to create
open-codes that contained both subjects and actions, where
appropriate. For example, “create a PP” or “read camera
permission state”. As with the drivers, one researcher open
coded the whole dataset, and the other coder did the same for
10%. Two researchers then grouped the codes into themes
using thematic analysis [40]. We do not report the kappa
values as they were open coded.
Accepted answers
One researcher analysed the accepted answers, that is “When
a user receives a good answer to their question, that user has
the option to “accept” an answer.” [68], and coded them into
these categories: 1) provides a solution, explanation, advice,
opinion, sample code by an SO user, 2) links to another SO
question, 3) when there is a link to an official documentation
with or without any further explanation, and 4) links to an
unofficial resource with or without any further explanation.
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Figure 3. Top 50 most commonly used tags by users (SO-privacy).
Topic label Top five words
1. Access to and read contents app, application, use, android, privacy
2. Set the privacy field user, privacy, like, page, facebook
3. App purchase and user registration device, ios, cloud, feature, access
4. Privacy and permission settings and dialogues app, user, privacy, access, ios
5. Crash reporting, analytics tools, and trackers crashlytics, tracker, integrate, news, advertiser
6. PPs in Google Play and Android app, policy, privacy policy, privacy, store
7. Concerns about using Google services google, button, use google, ad, click
8. Publicity of sensitive data in code repositories analytics, firebase, repository, google analytics, git
9. Design a db schema with privacy settings table, privacy, column, transaction, mysql
10. Privacy values in Facebook, YouTube, and plists privacy, post, set, facebook, api
11. Image privacy statements in Instagram and Windows image, windows, statement, instagram, privacy statement
12. Store users’ sensitive data securely datum, user, use, address, information
13. Access to, create, and upload photos and albums photo, album, picture, save, access photo
14. Private and public variables file, private, privacy, use, code
15. Browsers errors (cookies and security settings) use, privacy, website, browser, site
Table 3. LDA topics and the top 5 words in the topic (SO-privacy).
LDA FINDINGS
Table 3 shows the 15 LDA topic clusters generated from SO-
privacy and their researcher-generated labels. The topics in-
clude a wide set of common security and privacy concepts
such as access control, secure storage, data management, con-
fidentiality, user consent, human factors, and tracking.
Apps are a large issue for developers, with terms like “app”
occurring in multiple topics as well as the names of platforms
that host apps such as Google and Facebook. App-related
concepts such as permission settings are also a clear cross-
cutting topic ranging from photo to location permissions.
Server-side issues also appear across several themes such
as database design, handling of sensitive data, encryption,
blockchain, handling account access, and storing passwords.
The topics suggest that developers are encountering privacy
not just as part of user-facing elements such as dialogues and
alerts, but also in the design of their back-end infrastructure.
We also see a topic on public/private variable scopes (topic
14). Examination of questions associated with this topic show
typographical errors where the user wrote “privacy” when they
meant “private”. While this topic is outside our scope, it is
nice to see it neatly forms a distinct topic.
We find that “want” and “need”, indicating that the asker
is attempting a specific task as in “I need to access a file”,
are highly-ranked in topics 1, 2, 6, 11, 12, and 14. This be-
haviour can be connected to the qualitative question type How.
“Thanks”, a marker of politeness and possibly of discomfort
with the SO community, is in the top 20 words indicating top-
ics 1 (content access) and 10 (Facebook/YouTube/plists). This
politeness divide may indicate differences in the background
and persona of users interested in those topics.
CODING FINDINGS
Of the 315 randomly selected in SO-privacy-rand, 21 were
excluded due to either being about private variables (scoping)
or being too vague to understand. This section focuses exclu-
sively on the remaining 294 questions. Because the research is
bottom-up, we decided to use SO users’ definition of “privacy”
to understand their usage of the word rather than force our
understanding of it. Consequently, the only posts we excluded
were clear misspellings, most commonly those confusing “pri-
vacy” with the scoping word “private” as in public/private
classes. This confusion was common enough to appear in the
LDA results (topic 14 in Table 3). One interesting result of
this user-lead definition is that some clusters are technically
more security-focused or more UI-focused. But in all cases,
the asker explicitly used the term “privacy” in the title or tags
indicating that they thought the question was privacy related
in some way.
Question types
How (186, 63%). These questions include instructions, solu-
tions, best practices, and possibilities: “I’ve used my personal
email address for [Git repository] commits and I’m trying to
set it to another one, before I make the repository public. [...]
Is there a way to remove it from there, too, without losing my
history?” [13323759 - 2012].
Abstract or Conceptual (50, 17%). These questions ask for
explanations, legal/policy/requirements advice, background
information on a component or process, or further conceptual
understanding. The asker’s goal was to get advice about legal,
policy, regulation, moral, or ethical implications: “What is
the hidden cost using these CDN services? If the script is not
cached by the browser and it loads the script from google what
could google potentially do with the information? Could it be
usefully extrapolated in conjunction with other services such
as search, analytics or adsense? Nothing is free, what’s the
catch?” [10133816 - 2012].
Error (46, 16%). These questions quote a specific er-
ror message to understand the provenance of errors, ex-
ceptions, crashes, or even compiler errors. Includes warn-
ings that are blocking progress to working project state
(compilation, upload to store, etc.), including emailed “fix
this” warnings from platforms. Questions containing com-
piler or similar errors are regularly observed on SO [18,
48, 56, 71]. Notably, the privacy questions quote warning
messages from platforms: “I still get privacy error with
“NET::ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID” in the browser
when I hit the ELB url using https” Answer:“The issue is that
you are using a self-signed certificate...” [45295709 - 2017].
Unexpected (12, 7%). The asker wants some observed unex-
pected behaviour explained. Includes surprise due to features
having been added or removed with a new version as well as
unexpected behaviours that arise from OS or device revisions.
A common example was the sudden addition or removal of
permission dialogues when the developer switches to a new
API version or different behaviour on different OS versions:
“I set microphone permission in info.plist file so record audion
permission alert displaying in iOS 10.3.2 but its not appearing
in iOS 10.3.3 devices.” [46297966 - 2019].
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Drivers
The largest driver was personal concerns, client or company
requirements (144, 49%). This finding is unsurprising, as this
group includes cases where no driver is explicitly cited. Com-
mon external drivers in this group included a client requesting
a feature, or commentary on what an app’s end-users wanted.
The second most common driver was feedback from a plat-
form (136, 46%). This finding also makes sense since many
third-party platforms, such as Facebook, have requirements
that developers must follow. A common issue was that Google
requires a URL to a PP if sensitive permissions are being used,
resulting in several askers turning to SO to understand either
why Google thought they were using sensitive permissions, or
how to create a PP that met Google’s requirements.
Drivers coming from laws and regulations (5, 2%) were least
common. These included concerns around topics like GDPR
or speculation about if an action was or was not legal. In SO-
privacy-rand, we only observed question about EU regulations;
however, in the broader SO-privacy sample, we observed men-
tions of regulations from other countries, such as the USA’s
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
Accepted answers
Answers contain sample codes, explanations, links to and
quotes from other resources, opinions, hints, and screenshots.
Out of 130 questions with an accepted answer: (76, 58%)
were answered by SO users; (36, 28%) had a link to official
documentations, websites, blogs; (17, 13%) had a link to
unofficial resources such as websites, blogs, Wikipedia, an
app, or a GitHub project; (4, 3%) were pointed to another
SO question. Dual coding occurred in links to another SO
questions in which two had a link to an official doc (included
in the official group as well), one had a link to an unofficial
doc (included in the unofficial category too), and one provided
a link to another SO question.
For links to unofficial sources, Wikipedia and GitHub were
most common. GitHub occurred eight times as a source for
referring to issues and bugs, projects and pages that could be
helpful to the asker. Wikipedia was used as a source for further
details and explanation of concepts in five answers (with the
concepts: AOL search data leak, flag fields, segmentation fault,
ePrivacy Regulation (European Union), and P3P).
PRIVACY ASPECT THEMATIC ANALYSIS FINDINGS
Each subsection describes the (sub)themes, number of ques-
tions, percentage, and the number of question views associated
with the theme. Table 4 gives an overview of the themes.
Access control (119, 40%, views: 103,654)
SO users often struggle to find information about updating
and changing the privacy status of posts, images, and videos
on social networks. They also ask about how to implement
systems that have different levels of access control.
Dealing with privacy settings (59, 20%)
When SO users want to set the privacy field of a post, image, or
video on social networks (Facebook, Youtube, Vimeo, Google
Calendar) they may not be able to find the right values, keys,
and features needed to do so. For example, finding how to
Theme No. Questions Total views Sub-themes (separated by “;”)
Access control 119 (40%) 103,654 Dealing with privacy settings; I’d like to do it, but
how?; UI elements; Browsers.
Privacy policies 39 (13%) 127,225 How to do it?; I got an error while trying to imple-
ment it; I have got an error in usage descriptions; Do
I need a privacy policy? Why?
Encryption 10 (3%) 11,100 How do I achieve it?; Tell me more about it.
Privacy and code issues 5 (2%) 2,523 -
Versions and updates 11 (4%) 22,269 Device and OS versions cause unexpected results;
Updates cause unexpected results.
Developers with privacy
concerns
71 (24%) 57,136 How to implement privacy?; Can I trust this service
or company?; Tell me about it.
Developers ignoring
PbD principles
18 (6%) 9,681 -
Developers as end-users 21 (7%) 89,279 How do I protect my data?; Privacy in version
control systems (Git); I have privacy concerns,
thoughts?
Table 4. Number of questions, total views, and sub-themes for each
theme for the 294 qualitatively analysed questions.
set the privacy settings of videos on Vimeo via API: ”How
to change a Vimeo’s video privacy via API (PHP)? [...] I’ve
followed every step specified by the Vimeo’s API Documen-
tation but I can’t get it to work. What am I doing wrong?”
[52080930 - 2018]. Another user is looking for which pri-
vacy setting are available through the API: “Which Facebook
Privacy settings can be accessed through API? I’m about to
start an ASP.NET project which uses Facebook API to get/set
Facebook Privacy settings [...] or is there any other way to
access other privacy settings, too?” [9093704 - 2012].
Errors messages can happen when doing things like: access-
ing restricted resources on an OS, setting the status of posts
on social networks, or defining custom access control. The
user below is trying to develop a messaging app for iOS with
private and public lists, but received an error: ““error:Error
Domain=com.quickblox.chat Code=503 “Service not avail-
able.” So if all privacy list works perfectly then how can my
blocked users could send me messages?” [27665795 - 2016].
I’d like to do it, but how? (31, 10%)
Other entities such as OS or personal drivers lead SO users to
ask questions about how to handle access control or provide it
to users. For example, “We develop a rails-based healthcare
application. What is the best way to configure our s3 imple-
mentation so that only the authenticated user has access to
the image?” [30602560 - 2018].
SO users also look for practices to design databases which
provide levels of access control to users: “Database Design
- Users and their privacy [...] It’s a good choose? I’m not
quite sure if i should create a new table to handle the privacy
settings. I must admit that database design isn’t my specialty
so really need some feedback about this.“ [5211799 - 2011].
Askers in this code tend to express personal or “right thing”
motivations for adding access control to their databases.
UI elements (18, 6%)
When a privacy dialogue pops up, developers want to get
notified about the user’s decision so they can react by making
changes to the interface or logic of the program: “It would be
a simple thing to reload the view content once the user grants
permission, but I’m having a surprisingly hard time finding a
method that is called when that happens.” [29338752 - 2015].
Drivers for these questions come from platforms forcing access
controls and permission requests.
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Browsers (11, 4%)
Browsers have several features, such as cookie blocking and
certificate checking, that are intended to protect users’ privacy
and security. However, these features can cause issues for
developers, such as getting certificate errors when they are
using “localhost” during testing, managing cookies, and gen-
erating certificates. “My question is how to setup valid SSL
certificate on localhost? or do I need to edit my configuration?”
[35565278 - 2016]. Similarly with cookie blocking: “If we
set on IE11 privacy settings to medium, we succesfully get our
value from session, but if we set to “Block All Cookies” - we
get null. What can cause it? How to avoid?” [24059471 -
2014]. The driver for these questions generally comes from
browser behaviour and errors.
Privacy policies (39, 13%, views: 127,225)
Developers are often compelled by law, forced by platforms or
are personally motivated to provide privacy policies (PPs) to
users. SO users ask conceptual questions around PPs as well
as more specific questions about how to write them.
How to do it? (15, 5%)
When writing a PP for their apps, SO users have to deal with
multiple aspects of composition: wording, technical changes
to make their code compliant, effects of third-parties such
as analytics libraries, platforms’ PP interfaces, and reusing
PPs on multiple platforms. For example, complying with
GDPR: “Due to GDPR I am requiring to check the users
location whether the user is from European Union” [50253418
- 2018]. Another user reacted to a news article about Apple’s
policy against analytics tools and is concerned that their app
might be rejected by Apple because of third-party libraries:
“I’ve just integrated Crashlytics into my code, app is still waiting
for review [...] My question is should we be worried by using
Crashlytics & Firebase’s screen tracking (analytics). Will
Apple object it?” [54658427 - 2019].
I got an error while trying to implement it. (10, 3%)
Questions in this theme deal with errors users got from the
platform while trying to publish their app: “i can’t publish
my facebook application, when i click “yes” on Status and
Reviews of developers platform i see this message “You must
provide a valid Privacy Policy URL in order take your app
Live. Go to App Details and make sure it is valid.” in privacy
field i have a right url and i tried also to change it with others
but continue to see the messsage. this happens not just for one
application but also for others.” [26944634 - 2018].
I have an error in the usage description. (10, 3%)
Apple, in particular, forces “usage description” for accessing
restricted resources such as contacts and location. SO users
ask questions about errors and crashes they get during develop-
ment because they do not know how to set these values. They
are also confused about messages they receive from Apple
after submitting apps without the correct usage descriptions:
“iOS 10 GM release error when submitting apps “app attempts
to access privacy-sensitive data without a usage description”
due to GoogleSignIn, AdMob.” [39383289 - 2018].
Do I need a privacy policy? Why? (4, 1%)
SO users are confused about why or if a PP is necessary. For
simple apps, it can be unclear if a PP is even necessary, or even
what the definition of “sensitive data” is. “My app’s operates
on a simple couple of button clicks. However, as I am gearing
up to release it, I couldn’t help but notice nearly all the apps
have at least a privacy policy and terms/conditions on there
page. Is it legally necessary to have both? Or is it just good
practice?” [56606092 - 2019].
Encryption (10, 3%, views: 11,100)
A fairly small set of questions fall into the encryption theme.
Most have a personal motivation or a client requirement.
How do I achieve it? (7, 2%)
Users asked questions about how to implement encryption
solutions. “What could be the best solution to store this data
encrypted in a remote database and that only the data’s owner
could decrypt it? How to make this process transparent to
the user? (You can’t use the user’s password as the key to
encrypt his data, because you shouldn’t know his password).”
[39772 - 2013]. Questions about encryption errors are also
asked: “I’m using the GnuPG class from PHP. I’m not having
any problem importing valid public key but if I try to import
something random like “test” which obviously isn’t a public
key, I’m getting error 502 bad gateway.” [34557651 - 2016].
Tell me more about it. (3, 1%)
These questions ask for further information about encryption
solutions. “Since the salt is used to add a huge range of pass-
word possibilities [...] what is the purpose of letting the salt
insecure? [...] Is there something that I dont understand? I
know that knowing the salt dont break the security but, say-
ing that it “need not be kept secret” sounds strange to me.”
[6176848 - 2011].
Privacy and code issues (5, 2%, views: 2,523)
This theme includes errors that are specifically code level and
raised due to a function call, security flag, and static analysis
tools: “We use HPE to check the code potential risks, i got
one critical issue below in Log util class “The method d() in
LogUtil.java mishandles confidential information, which can
compromise user privacy and is often illegal”. how can i do
to fix this?” [44410004 - 2017].
Versions and updates (11, 4%, views: 22,269)
SO users ask questions when they observe OS and platform
behaviours that violate their expectations or desires.
Device and OS versions cause unexpected results. (6, 2%)
Multiple versions for OS and devices can cause frustration
for SO users. They test their code on one OS or device, and
expect the same behaviour on others. But, this is not always
a valid assumption: “But sometimes iPhone 5s running iOS
8.4 and always iPhone 6 Plus running iOS 9 does not show
my app under the privacy photos list.” [32646366 - 2015].
Updates cause unexpected results. (5, 2%)
Updates to OS, platforms, and PPs can be a pain point for
SO users: “I want to give the users of my App the option to
control which lists their actions show to by default. The new
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API seems to have taken a feature away because I can’t see
where that control is!” [7523282 - 2012].
Developers with privacy concerns (71, 24%, views:57,136)
This theme includes questions which are generally in align-
ment with PbD principles such as minimise, hide, abstract,
control, enforce, and inform [35]. Askers in this theme looked
for solutions to collect less data, mask personal information,
remove unnecessary data, minimise tracking, and other ap-
proaches to protect privacy.
These users ask questions about protecting resources such as
cookies, location, handwritten documents, browsing habits,
IP address, data to build charts and graphs, messages, email
address, contacts, Apple ID, phone number, card number,
names, health data, country, phone calls, patient health in-
formation, personal documents, Facebook activity, images,
driver licenses, device IDs, browser history, birth dates, social
security numbers, passwords, videos, and the phone’s screen.
How to implement privacy? (33, 11%)
Questions in this theme ask about developing privacy-
preserving solutions. The motivations come from either per-
sonal concerns or requirement from clients. “My add displays
private data, so I don’t want it to be possible to see the app
contents in the task switcher.” [13260462 - 2012] Similarly:
“I want to mask PII (personal Identification Information) like
Name. Birth Date, SSN, Credit card Number, Phone Number,
etc. It should remain same formate , means it looks like real
data. And shouldn’t be reversible. And it should take less time
to mask.” [22387577 - 2016].
Can I trust this service or company? (10, 3%)
Specific questions around trusting services are gathered in this
theme. The motivations for these questions are either personal
or business reasons. For example, when users want to decide
to use services (an API or a product) in their projects, they
have questions about how much they can trust it with their
data and intellectual property: “Can I trust react-devtools not
to breach my privacy? [...] The tool (and react) is made by
Facebook, a company infamously known for their complete
lack of moral when it comes to data gathering and creepy
surveilance of us all. And it requires the ability to access
everything you are browsing (which is probably needed to
work it’s magic), in order to be installed.” [54549807 - 2019].
Tell me about it. (28, 9%)
Conceptual questions around minimising lifetime of data, pri-
vacy implications of services (e.g. Google visualisation tools,
Google Drive, tracking and cookies, anonymisation). “Linking
to Google PlusOne, without embedding the button (for privacy
reasons) It seems that Google only offers code to embed the
+1 button. However, there are heavy privacy concerns (plus
quite some load time) associated with it.” [9248204 - 2013].
Developers ignoring PbD principles (18, 6%, views: 9,681)
SO users ask questions about workarounds to gain access to
data protected by permissions or platform protections. They
also have fundamental questions about the reasons for imple-
menting privacy-preserving solutions. They look for access
to resources such as: data belonging to other apps, WiFi,
Bluetooth, device settings, unique device ID, scores in games,
internet and camera permissions, make/model/serial number
of computers, screenshots and videos, locations, IP addresses,
names, and email address.
SO users ask the community about whether there is a need
to do a task with privacy in mind or they can do it without
needing privacy permissions. “How should an app commu-
nicate with a server operated by its developer without an-
droid.permission.INTERNET? Or is there a reliable source
stating that this is impossible in Android?” [29545251 - 2015].
Some questions looked for instructions on how to collect data,
access restricted resources without following proper steps,
store sensitive data, combine data from multiple sources, en-
able cookies, bypass permissions, and identify users. “How
can I read the users computer make, model and serial number
from inside MS Edge browser? Using Microsoft Edge web
browser, under windows 10, how can I access the make/model
and serial number of the computer that the browser is running
on?” [43492726 - 2017].
Developers as end-users (21, 7%, views: 89,279)
Users also ask questions about how to protect the privacy of
their own data, software, and identity.
How do I protect my data? (11, 4%)
This theme includes questions around implementing a solu-
tion or finding a better approach to protect their own data or
intellectual property. “Whenever I start the program a little
eye icon appears in the upper right corner above the scroll
bar. It can’t be clicked. I assume it’s Google uploading my
usage data. How can I disable that?” [19327361 - 2013].
Privacy in version control systems (Git) (8, 3%)
SO users want to protect their source code and identity in
version control systems. They also look for suggestions about
how to provide access control to projects in these systems.
“Is it possible to completely remove an issue from the GitHub
issue tracker?” [3081521 - 2019] “What files/folders should
I ignore in a git repository of an iOS app? [...] Do the files
generated by cocoapods contain some of my private informa-
tion? Does info.plist file contain my private stuff as well?
Also, when I was putting Firebase into my app, I downloaded
a GoogleService-Info.plist. Should I ignore it as well? What
things should I ignore?” [37479924 - 2016].
I have privacy concerns, thoughts? (2, 1%)
Questions around personal privacy concerns are grouped here.
For personal reasons, SO users look for suggestions to protect
their own data in the workspace or from other software com-
panies. “I recently purchased an advanced chat script which
includes free installation on my server. I don’t know how to
install it but the company says they provide installation if I
provide them with the following information: [list of resources
to provide access] I don’t feel comfortable giving all that info
out to them but I know it’s required for them to integrate the
script to work with my online forum.” [4973811 - 2011].
DISCUSSION
We are not the first to explore how developers think about
and interact with privacy concepts. In particular, Hadar et
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al. conducted a set of interviews with developers with the
aim of understanding their thinking and attitudes around pri-
vacy [33]. Similar to our findings, they find that developers
often conflate the word “privacy” with security concepts. For
example, equating permissions with privacy even though they
are technically an access control topic, and have applications
beyond privacy. From our own work, we see the conflation
of privacy with security potentially coming from the phrasing
on platform websites, such as calling permissions “privacy
permissions”. Developers then learn to equate permissions
with the term “privacy”. Also, when speaking of privacy, SO
users employ language similar to the language of developers
in other contexts: encryption, access control, data collection,
data removal, data lifetime, and anonymisation are all recur-
ring themes both in our data and in findings from Hadal et al.’s
interviews with developers [33].
Of our random question sample (SO-privacy-rand), 17% were
conceptual, indicating that developers are looking for advice
around privacy-related tasks in the early stages of software
development. Such decision-making questions can impact the
privacy as well as the security of software: “Security defines
which privacy choices can be implemented” [15, p. 669].
Supporting privacy policy creation tasks
While there is research on making PPs understandable for end
users [34, 58, 72], there is minimal research on helping devel-
opers craft PPs. The lack of support can be seen in the wild,
where there are still numerous apps without PPs [77] as well
PPs that contain misleading and contradictory statements [7].
In our data, many questions ask for help creating privacy poli-
cies. Based on our observations, we hypothesise that some
of the problems observed in the wild might be coming from
developers who: 1) do not know that they need a PP, 2) do not
see a reason for adding a PP, 3) do not know what language
needs to be in a PP for their app’s unique profile, 4) are trying
to add a PP but cannot do it because of complicated procedures
as well as unhelpful user interfaces, and 5) see PPs as a wall
that is blocking their app being published, with the resulting
frustration leading to reluctance to prepare a well written PP.
Developers are sometimes confused about why a PP is needed
because they honestly believe that they are not collecting any
sensitive data. The developer’s understanding of “sensitive”
sometimes differed from the platform’s definition. Advertising
and tracking libraries were another common cause of confu-
sion. Developers were not using sensitive permissions directly,
but had included an advertising library which was using some.
When they tried publishing their app on an app store, they got
a warning that a PP was needed due to sensitive permission
usage. They then turned to SO to understand the cause of the
issue. Similarly, third-party APIs have privacy implications
that need to be reflected in the developer’s own PP, with some
users turning to SO to figure out exactly what they needed to
add to their PP because they used, for example, Firebase which
is an app-building infrastructure. The above scenarios exhibit
three important themes: 1) the role of platforms in defining
what “sensitive” is, 2) the awareness developers have around
the types of data their apps collect, and 3) the implications of
third-party code and services on PPs.
Writing a PP is a challenging task for developers, especially if
they are freelancers or part of small companies with limited
legal resources. There is much potential for providing more
support to them in this space, particularly automated support
which can identify third-party libraries and services in their
code and walk them through setting up a PP that correctly
describes how data will be collected, stored, and used. This
support is particularly needed when the privacy implications
of using a service are not immediately obvious. For example,
uploading images to Google’s image search to find similar
images may cause Google to retain and index the uploaded
image as Google puts in its PP: “When you upload, submit,
store, send or receive content to or through our Services, you
give Google (and those we work with) a worldwide license
to use, host, store, reproduce...” [28]. Another advantage of
automated support is the capability to automatically detect and
adapt to changes that occur when third-party PPs change, such
as library version updates.
Another possible solution is to better integrate privacy check-
ing into the code development process so that developers can
address issues early instead of being rejected when publish-
ing their app or receiving legal complaints after it has been
published. Both situations frustrate developers, who feel that
they are “done” only to find that they have not yet fulfilled
legal obligation. For example, one common cause of app re-
jection on the Apple Store is “Requesting Permission” without
suitable disclosure to the user about permission usage [8].
There are some tools to help with early identification of po-
tential privacy issues due to permission usage. For example,
Coconut is an IDE plugin that warns developers during coding
when they are dealing with privacy-related tasks such as deal-
ing with user location [41], allowing developers to make any
necessary changes earlier in the development process. Such
tools could be improved by supporting changes that occur
between versions of third-party code. Otherwise, if Apple
decides that a new permission is needed to access a specific re-
source, the developer might only discover the change through
experimentation or user complaints.
Platforms as privacy drivers
Platforms such as Apple and Android exert powerful influence
on privacy ecosystem [31]. They define the meaning of sensi-
tive content, data, and resource such as camera, contacts, and
location [9, 29]. One of the main reasons to ask questions
about privacy on SO is rooted in platform requirements. SO
users see platforms as gatekeepers for publishing their apps,
and perhaps their income source. This gatekeeper role gives
platforms the power to enforce privacy behaviour in the appli-
cations they host. While some percentage will always try and
circumvent, we found that the majority of SO developers were
honestly trying to follow the requirements set by platforms.
Platforms also operate as an intermediary between the devel-
oper and user on privacy issues. For example, iOS decides
when to ask the user about a permission usage and also con-
trols the design of the permission UI the user sees. On one
hand, this intermediary role removes a great deal of respon-
sibility from the developer and gives users a more consistent
experience. On the other hand, developers loose the ability to
9
control the full experience of their apps. They also have hand-
off related problems when the user is taken to a privacy-related
platform screen and then somehow must seamlessly return to
the app, even if they have just denied vital permissions.
Shadow documentation
While platforms often provide guidance and documentation
around their APIs, libraries, and services, developers still need
more specific or targeted guidance. One role SO fills is to pro-
vide this documentation through community sourcing answers
to specific questions. It is effectively producing a shadow
version of official documentation, in a form similar to a Q&A.
Parnin et al. studied the Android API documentation and
found that 87% of class documentation is also covered on
SO [51], making SO a near-complete replacement for consult-
ing official Android documentation. We see similar behaviour
with privacy posts: the answers not only include official docu-
mentation, but also provide documentation-like information
that does not appear elsewhere. Examples include guidance
around how to write a PP or how to interpret permissions in
relation to existing company guidelines. In effect, SO also
hosts community-generated developer-friendly shadow doc-
umentation of company policies, PPs, laws, and regulations.
On SO, legal-jargon heavy “documentation” is translated into
case-specific guidance phrased in a developer-friendly way.
Topic modelling
Topic modelling, which formed the core of our automated
analysis, proved an effective way to analyse the entirety of
our corpus without the expense or time investment of human
annotation. It confirmed impressions of categories from the
qualitative annotations, while also pointing to more granular
categories and related patterns around language use.
Our manual qualitative analysis and our LDA produced similar
high-level results. For example, privacy policies, permission
settings, browser errors, and privacy in code repositories come
up in both methods. While the obvious difference is scale
and time required, there were less-obvious interesting differ-
ences such as LDA’s natural focus on company names (i.e.
Google, Facebook) where the manual coding abstracted these
to “platforms”. Overall, LDA found topics that are relevant
and interesting, with more granularity than the qualitative
topics we identified. However, many details of interest were
not evident from LDA topics. LDA is a bag-of-words model,
meaning that it lacks syntax and semantics in its resulting
topics. Consequently the model cannot differentiate issues
like if the asker was trying to preserve privacy or intentionally
circumvent protections to collect protected data.
Though most of our focus was on qualitative findings, LDA
suggested potential avenues of future research. We observed
differences across topics in the use of nontechnical vocabu-
lary, like “want”, which suggested that some topics are goal-
oriented while others are more curiosity-driven and abstract.
We also observed differences in the use of polite words like
“thanks”, which relate to linguistic register, or formality. Dif-
ferences in register highlight how different topics draw users
of disparate technical backgrounds or who project different
personas through their language use.
LIMITATIONS
Not all SO users are native English speakers; therefore, we
may have misinterpreted some questions because of language
issues. Furthermore, we collected questions from SO’s full
history, hence, some questions may be outdated, though we
generally found that while technology aged, the high-level
problems remained relevant. SO askers are only occasionally
explicit about their driver for posting. Drivers such as com-
piler errors, or platform requirements are clear from text, but
motivation-style drivers like personal or client are very chal-
lenging to differentiate cleanly. While the difference would be
interesting, we cannot provide it with high confidence.
When starting our qualitative analysis process, we reviewed
three privacy frameworks [35, 62, 64] to create a group ground-
ing for the term “privacy”. While we ultimately decided to use
SO users’ own definition of the word, this early review may
have impacted our analysis.
FUTURE WORK
Prior work has shown that traces of SO code snippets are visi-
ble in the apps that people use. Potential future work might
look at traces of SO’s answers in app PPs. A further step
in understanding privacy on SO is to explore answers and
questions together to understand the dynamics between users
and how they build knowledge around privacy-related topics.
Developers in small companies who integrate ad networks
for monetisation view advertisement companies as being re-
sponsible for user privacy [46]; our work points to similar
questions about how developers view app stores and them-
selves in relation to users’ privacy. Experiments with LDA
point to distinct nontechnical language use in different top-
ics; future work could look at politeness, formality, and other
aspects of persona associated with different privacy topics,
possibly investigating what questions are asked by different
communities or skill levels of programmers.
CONCLUSION
We analysed privacy-related questions on SO with LDA and
qualitative analysis. Our results show that SO users face chal-
lenges while writing and modifying privacy policies; working
with or designing systems with access control; dealing with up-
dates to platforms and APIs; and deciding on privacy aspects
of their projects. Platforms can use these results to improve
the privacy-related workflows to create an experience that is
efficient and convenient. Google, Apple, and Facebook are
privacy influencers who define what content is considered sen-
sitive, and are major drivers that bring developers to SO to
ask privacy questions. Any of these entities have the ability to
impact how developers think about and interact with privacy
and impact the privacy ecosystem of software.
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